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Sentencing Reform in California
AARON RAPPAPORT*
Introduction
Over the past twenty-five years, California's prison population
has increased dramatically - from about 25,000 inmates in 1980 to
approximately 172,000 in 2008.1 A primary cause of this increase
has been the series of changes in the sentencing laws, including the
enactment of the Determinate Sentencing Law (the "DSL") of 1976,
the passage of the Three Strikes law in 1994, and a host of lesser
changes to the sentencing system.
2
This policy change has had dramatic implications for the state. It
has led to a prison system bursting at the seams, widely criticized for
its poor conditions, and now subject to federal court oversight.3 It
has put an enormous strain on the state budget at a time of great
fiscal challenges. And it has heightened concerns about the
effectiveness - and basic fairness - of California's criminal justice
system.4 Indeed, repeatedly, California has been cited as possessing
one of the worst, if not the worst, prison system in the nation.
5
* Aaron Rappaport, Professor of Law, University of California, Hastings College of Law.
The author would like to thank Brian Hoeber and Nicholas Martin for their research assistance.
1. DATA ANALYSIS UNIT, CAL. DEP'T OF CORR. & REHAB., HISTORICAL TRENDS 1980-
2000 3 (2001), available at http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/Reports-Research/OffenderInformation_
Services Branch/Annual/HIST2/HIST2d2000.pdf, DATA ANALYSIS UNIT, CAL. DEP'T OF CORR.
& REHAB., AVERAGE DAILY PRISON POPULATION 3 (2009), available at http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/
ReportsResearch/Offender_InformationServicesBranch/Annual/IPOP2/IPOP2d0812.pdf.
Some public documents describe the prison population as being approximately 155,000 inmates
today. That number includes only inmates held in California's thirty-three prisons, and does not
include prisoners held in community centers, hospitals, or out-of-state detention facilities.
2. See, e.g., California Corrections: Confronting Institutional Crisis, Lethal Injection, and
Sentencing Reform in 2007, 13 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 117, 139 (2008) ("This emphasis on
rehabilitation began to change in 1977" with the adoption of the DSL. "During the following
decade California's legislature passed more than 1000 laws increasing mandatory prison
sentences, culminating in 1994 with the enactment of the Three Strikes law ....").
3. For further discussion of this litigation, see infra Aaron Rappaport, Litigation over
Prison Medical Services, 7 HASTINGS RACE & POVERTY L.J. (this issue, Winter 2010).
4. The State's 2009-2010 budget allocates $8.234 billion (or 6.9% of total state
expenditures) to the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation ("CDCR"). CAL.
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Despite these problems, efforts to make significant changes to
the sentencing scheme have repeatedly failed, swamped by a
persistent and often unthinking tough-on-crime mentality - at least
until recently. In the last two years, a series of events have brought
the issue of sentencing reform to the forefront. Serious sentencing
reform now appears to be a real possibility.
Three events have contributed to this new attitude. First,
California's fiscal crisis has put pressure on officials to cut costs,
leading to heightened scrutiny of the prison system as a source of
savings. Second, litigation over prison conditions has resulted in a
federal court order requiring the state to release approximately
40,000 inmates, forcing the state to rethink how its correctional
resources are allocated. Third, in 2007, the U.S. Supreme Court
struck down a central part of California's sentencing system as
unconstitutional. The legislature adopted a "temporary" fix designed
to salvage the system, but it is set to expire in two years.
The time, in short, seems ripe to have a real debate on whether
California's sentencing system needs major reform. Whether the
political branches are capable of making the necessary changes,
however, remains a question. Indeed, as this essay argues, the steps
needed to make California's sentencing system workable, just and
effective require far more than a few modifications at the margins.
California needs nothing less than a complete overhaul of its
sentencing structure.
DEP'T OF FIN., ENACTED BUDGET SUMMARY - ALL CHAPTERS 37 (2009), available at
http://www.ebudget.ca.gov/pdf/Enacted/BudgetSummary/FullBudgetSummary.pdf. Due to
California's budget crisis, this figure is $1.798 billion, or eighteen percent, less than that allocated
in the 2008-2009 budget. Id. at 38. Federal funds, other non-governmental cost funds, and
reimbursements provide the CDCR an additional $4.950 billion, almost exclusively for
infrastructure projects, bringing the total CDCR budget to $13.187 billion. CAL. DEP'T OF FIN.,
2009-2010 BUDGET - ENACTED BUDGET DETAIL - CORRECTIONS AND REHABILITATION
(2009), available at http://www.ebudget.ca.gov/Enacted/StateAgencyBudgets/5210/agency.html.
5. See, e.g., Gina Giacopuzzi, California's Prison System, What Now?, SAN DIEGO NEWS
ROOM, May 6, 2009, available at http://www.sdnn.com/sandiego/2009-05-06/news/politics-city-
county-government/californias-prison-system-what-now ("It's no secret that California's prisons
are among the worst in the nation."); Posting of D-Day to Our Prison Problem, http://d-
day.blogspot.com/2008/02/our-prison-problem.html (Feb. 28, 2008, 19:03 PST), ("[T]he Golden
State has one of the worst, if not the worst, prison system in the entire country."). See also
Robert Weisberg, Connecting Criminal Justice Scholarship with Criminal Justice Reform: How
Sentencing Commissions Turned Out To Be A Good Idea, 12 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 179, 222-23
(2007) ("By the reckoning of its own established state oversight agency, California has the most
dysfunctional correctional system in the nation.").
[Vol. 7
SENTENCING REFORM IN CALIFORNIA
I. Introduction to California Sentencing
California's sentencing system actually consists of two
overlapping sentencing systems: a "determinate" sentencing
structure and an indeterminate "lifer" system.
A fairly large number of offenders in California's prison system
are serving "life sentences" of fifteen or twenty-five years to life.
These include offenders sentenced to the most serious types of
offenses, like murder, as well as offenders sentenced under
California's notorious Three Strikes law.
6
The Three Strikes law is relatively well known. Defendants are
eligible for Three Strikes if they have two prior "serious felonies" (as
defined by law) and their current offense is "any felony." 7
Defendants convicted under Three Strikes receive sentences of
twenty-five years to life for each eligible count. 8
By contrast, the details of the DSL are much less frequently
discussed, even though many more offenders are sentenced under the
DSL's provisions. 9 In part, this is because the rules for applying the
DSL are extremely complex. Nonetheless, the general outline of the
DSL's approach can be understood if we limit our attention to a
simple case - the case of an individual offender convicted of a
single crime. 10
Under the DSL, crimes typically allow for three possible
sentences: a lower, middle, and upper term. For instance, the offense
of "continuous sexual abuse of a child" is punishable by six, twelve,
6. Approximately 23,300 inmates (13.8% of the prison population) are "lifers." DATA
ANALYSIS UNIT, CAL. DEPT. OF CORR. & REHAB., PRISON CENSUS DATA 15 (2009), available
at http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/ReportsResearch/Offender Information ServicesBranch/Annual/
Census/CENSUSdO812.pdf. An additional 3,814 (2.2%) are serving life sentences without the
possibility of parole. Id. A further 35,160 (20.5%) have been sentenced for their second strike.
Id. And finally, another 8,342 (4.9%) are third-strikers. Id. The remaining prison population
consists of 99,997 (58.4%) sentenced under the DSL, and 654 (0.4%) sentenced to death. Id.
7. CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 667.5, 1192.7 (Deering 2009).
8. Defendants with only one prior serious offense who have a current felony conviction can
be sentenced under the corresponding "two strikes" provision. That provision effectively doubles
the sentence for the crime of conviction. Id. §§ 667, 1170.12.
9. The DSL was enacted in 1976, signed by then-Governor Jerry Brown, and became
effective in 1977.
10. In making sense of California's DSL, I rely heavily on the important work of Judges J.
Richard Couzens and Tricia Bigelow. See J. RICHARD COUZENS & TRICIA BIGELOW, BASIC
ELEMENTS OF FELONY SENTENCING (2009).
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or sixteen years of imprisonment.11  The original idea was that the
middle, or "normal," term was the presumptive sentence. A judge
was required to impose that sentence unless he or she found
appropriate circumstances warranting an aggravated or mitigated
term.
However, in Cunningham v. California, the U.S. Supreme Court
deemed this approach unconstitutional, holding that it violated the
defendant's Sixth Amendment right to jury trial. 13 To remedy the
constitutional violation and preserve the basic structure of the
sentencing scheme, the legislature enacted a "temporary" fix, called
SB40, which allowed the judge to choose any one of the three
sentencing options without making further fact-finding. 14  Thus, a
judge faced with an offender convicted of continuous abuse of a
minor would have virtually unfettered discretion to impose a
sentence of six, twelve, or sixteen years.' 5  The specific sentence
chosen is sometimes called the "base offense level."
In addition to the base offense level, the DSL also authorizes a
judge to make several additional adjustments to the ultimate sentence
to reflect specific features of the offense and offender. One is the so-
called "conduct enhancement," which attaches to specific charges.' 
6
The conduct enhancements can take into account circumstances
related to the crime or victim. Common enhancements increase the
sentence because of the use of a firearm, the infliction of injury, or
the amount of financial loss.
Usually, an enhancement will require a specific increase in
sentence. For example, the use of a gun triggers a one-year increase
in the sentence. 17 In addition, conduct enhancements are associated
11. CAL. PENAL CODE § 288.5(a).
12. Cunningham v. California, 549 U.S. 270, 277 (2007).
13. Id. at 283. The ruling was based on the constitutional rules set out in the Court's
Apprendi line of cases. Id. at 275.
14. SB40 was expiring on January 1, 2009, but the Legislature extended it for another two-
year term, buying time to consider a more permanent change to the sentencing scheme.
15. This example, of course, assumes that no additional enhancements or adjustments apply
to increase the sentence further.
16. The formal term is "specific enhancements." See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170.11 ("the
term 'specific enhancement' means an enhancement that relates to the circumstances of the
crime.").
17. Exceptions exist. For example, some enhancements have triads of their own. See, e.g.,
CAL. PENAL CODE § 12022.2(a) ("Any person who, while armed with a firearm in the
commission or attempted commission of any felony, has in his or her immediate possession
ammunition . . . designed primarily to penetrate metal or armor" shall "be punished by an
additional term of... 3, 4, or 10 years.").
[Vol. 7
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with specific counts. As a result, in a multi-count conviction, the
same adjustment might apply to different counts, so long as the
enhancements refer to different criminal conduct.
A second kind of enhancement is based not on the criminal
conduct (or victim characteristics), but on the status of the defendant
at the time the crime was committed. For example, a common
enhancement adds one year to the prison sentence for each of the
defendant's prior convictions. Other enhancements might be
warranted if, say, the defendant committed the current crime while
out on bail or out on his own recognizance for a previous crime.
Where multiple enhancements apply to a defendant, they run
consecutively. Thus, if a defendant has three prior convictions, three
years will be added to his sentence.
1 8
The ultimate sentence is comprised of the three factors just
discussed: (1) the base offense level; (2) any relevant conduct
enhancements; and (3) any relevant status enhancements. This
description might make the DSL appear rather straightforward in its
application. The reality is much different. As the Little Hoover
Commission has observed, "[t]oday, there are more than 1,000
felony sentencing laws and more than 100 felony sentence
enhancements across twenty-one separate sections of California
law."'19  Furthermore, all of the rules discussed above have
exceptions that might come into play in an actual case: special rules
for imposing sentences after violating probation, for low level drug
crimes (under Proposition 36), for sex crimes, for domestic violence
cases, for gang crimes, for hate crimes, for deciding when you can or
cannot strike prior enhancements, for multi-count prosecutions. In
other words, while the general idea of California's determinate
sentencing system is straightforward, the actual practice is not.
II. Evaluating California's Sentencing System
The basic parameters of the sentencing system are relatively
clear. But is it a good system? Although a full review of the State's
18. Id. § 667.5(b). Subject to a few exceptions, the sentencing court may dismiss most
status enhancements "in furtherance ofjustice." Id. § 1385(a).
19. LITTLE HOOVER COMM'N, SOLVING CALIFORNIA'S CORRECTIONS CRISIS: TIME IS
RUNNING OUT 34 (2007), available at http://www.lhc.ca.gov/studies/i85/Report185.pdf.
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enormously complex system is beyond the scope of this essay, a few
general comments can be made. As I suggest below, California's
sentencing system fails to satisfy what seem to be three essential
features of any modem sentencing system. First, the system must be
administratively feasible. Second, the system must place reasonable
restrictions on the discretion of the sentencing judge. Third, the
system must have a rule-making institution capable of weighing and
balancing the complex individual and social factors inherent in the
sentencing decision.
How does California fare on each measure?
A. Administratively Feasible
First, the sentencing system must be administratively feasible. If
the rules are so complex that judges and practitioners cannot
comprehend or apply the rules, the system is obviously going to fail
to serve its purposes. Judges will reach inconsistent results when
faced with similar cases, and defendants (and their counsel) will lack
fair notice of the punishments to which they are subject.
On this measure, California's system fails miserably. It is hard
to imagine a more confusing and incoherent system. To illustrate the
complexity of the DSL, consider the following illustration offered by
Judge Richard Couzens (at a talk presented at the Administrative
Office of the Courts).2 °
A defendant with one prior conviction is charged and ultimately
convicted of three offenses: (1) residential burglary; (2) drug
possession; and (3) grand theft. The sentencing triads associated
with each offense are as follows:
Residential burglary - two, four, or six years.
21
Drug possession - sixteen months, two years, or four years.
22
Grand theft - sixteen months, two years, or three years.
23
20. Judge J. Richard Couzens, Presentation to students of University of California, Hastings
College of the Law, Administrative Office of the Courts of California (Jan. 2009). 1 am indebted
to Judge J. Richard Couzens for this example. Needless to say, Judge Couzens is not responsible
for any errors I have made in the sentencing calculations to follow.
21. CAL. PENAL CODE § 459.
22. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11377.
23. CAL. PENAL CODE § 487.
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In addition, assume that the offender was found to have been
armed during the grand theft, triggering a one-year conduct
enhancement for that charge. 14 What is the appropriate sentence in
this case?
In a multi-count conviction, the sentencing judge is required to
make a preliminary judgment about the appropriate sentence for each
individual count. Assume, for now, that the judge chooses a two-
year sentence for residential burglary (the middle term), a four-year
sentence for drug possession (the upper term), and a three-year
sentence for grand theft (the middle term for grand theft plus one
additional year for the weapon enhancement). If we assume that the
counts involve separate criminal conduct, the central question is how
to combine these three sentences.25 The answer turns initially on
whether the judge believes the sentences should apply consecutively
or concurrently. The judge usually has discretion to make this
determination. If the judge decides to impose concurrent
sentences, the rules are relatively straightforward: the offender's
sentence will be equal to the longest sentence of the three counts. So
in the example above, the longest sentence is for the drug offense -
four years. The defendant's ultimate sentence, then, will be five
years - four years for the drug offense plus a status enhancement of
one additional year (for the prior conviction).
But what about consecutive sentences? In that situation, does the
judge simply add up the sentences associated with each of the three
counts? No, she or he does not. To determine the sentence, the
judge must proceed through a number of distinct steps. First, the
court must identify the "principal" charge, which is the charge for
24. Id. § 12022(a)(1) ("[A]ny person who is armed with a firearm in the commission of a
felony or attempted felony shall be punished by an additional and consecutive term of ... one
year ... ").
25. Under California Penal Code section 654, a defendant cannot be punished for crimes
that concern the same criminal conduct. Id. § 654. Oddly, when section 654 applies, the judge
must sentence based on which crime has the largest potential sentence, whether or not the judge
would have chosen to impose that sentence. Id. Accordingly, in the example above, the judge
must impose the sentence for residential burglary, since it has the largest possible sentence (six
years). At the same time, the judge need not impose a six-year sentence. Rather, she must
choose one of the three possible sentencing options for that charge (two, four, or six years). What
is the rationale for this odd rule? Who knows.
26. However, there are exceptions to a judge's general discretion of whether a sentence
should be consecutive or concurrent. For example, certain designated crimes must be consecutive
(e.g., multiple violent sex crimes committed against separate victims or the same victim on
separate occasions).
Winter 20101
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which the judge would have actually imposed the longest sentence.
Given the sentences mentioned above, the principal charge is the
drug offense (four years in prison). The other counts are called
"subordinate consecutive terms."
The ultimate sentence will be equal to the sentence imposed for
the principal charge, plus one-third the "middle term" associated
with the subordinate counts. Status adjustments are added to the
final mix. In the example discussed above, the ultimate sentence
would combine the following sentences: four years (for the drug
offense); one year, four months (one-third of the middle term for
residential burglary); one year (one-third of the middle term for
grand theft and its enhancement); and one year for the prior criminal
record status enhancement. The total sentence, as a result, is seven
years, four months. 27
This is just a simple example, involving a very common
situation. There are all sorts of exceptions and special rules. For
instance, as noted above, with consecutive terms, the subordinate
terms are one-third their middle terms. But, certain statutes allow
sentences to be fully consecutive for egregious offenses. Also, there
are situations where carrying a gun during a theft is punishable by
more than one additional year.
The issues become even more complex when multiple cases,
rather than multiple counts, are involved. These are situations where
a defendant is sentenced on multiple cases that have been
"packaged" for a sentencing disposition, or where a defendant has
been sentenced to prison by one court for one crime and is soon after
prosecuted for another crime and sentenced by another court.
The rules in such cases are beyond complex and almost beyond
imagination. The bottom line: on administrative feasibility grounds
alone, California's system needs a major overhaul.
B. Appropriately Guided Discretion
A second requirement of a fair sentencing system is for the
system to impose appropriate limitations on the exercise of judicial
27. Note an odd feature of this general approach: when you calculate the contribution of the
subordinate terms, you do not take one-third the sentence that would have been imposed for that
count. Rather, you just take one-third the middle term, whether or not the judge would have
imposed that term. What is the rationale for that rule? Again, who knows.
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discretion. This requires a careful balancing of considerations. On
one hand, an extraordinary range of factors might be relevant to the
decision in any given case. No workable set of rules can incorporate
all the different circumstances that might be relevant; only the most
significant factors can be taken into account. As a result, any
effective sentencing structure must leave a fair amount of discretion
to the sentencing judge. 28
At the same time, giving judges largely unfettered discretion
over sentencing - as in the traditional indeterminate schemes - is
highly problematic. As past studies suggest, the approach can lead
to dramatic sentencing disparities, with similarly situated defendants
29receiving widely disparate sentences. To many, leaving sentencing
decisions - which have such a fundamental impact on human
liberty - to the unfettered discretion of a single person seems
fundamentally unjust.30
The implication is that some discretion should be left with
judges, but discretion should be constrained by appropriately
designed sentencing rules. A guided discretion regime, in other
words, seems best able to serve the goals of sentencing, assuming the
rule-making body is well-structured itself. Again, the California
sentencing system comes up short in developing a well-balanced
guided discretion regime. The system certainly limits the kinds of
sentencing options available to the court, but it does so in a largely
arbitrary and irrational way. An effective guided discretion regime
narrows the sentencing options to a limited range (e.g. two to four
years, or six to seven years). By contrast, California's sentencing
system identifies discrete sentencing options, which differ markedly
from each other.
28. I will use the term "sentencing judge," but I leave open the possibility that alternative
decision makers might serve in this role.
29. KATE STITH & JOSE A. CABRANES, FEAR OF JUDGING: SENTENCING GUIDELINES IN
THE FEDERAL COURTS 31 (Chicago Press 1998); William W. Berry III, Discretion Without
Guidance: The Need to Give Meaning to § 3553 After Booker and its Progeny, 40 CONN. L. REV.
631, 638 n.29 (2008).
30. On another level, one might also question whether a sentencing judge is particularly
well-positioned to make the range of judgments necessary for a wise punishment decision. While
a judge may have some ability to assess the impact of punishment on the individual offender, she
may be ill-suited for assessing the effect of punishment on public safety. Those kinds of
decisions require familiarity with studies of deterrence, recidivism, and even rehabilitation, which
may go beyond many judges' areas of competence.
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Consider the multi-count convictions discussed in the previous
section. We noted that the combined sentence in that case was seven
years and four months. Suppose, however, that the judge had
selected different initial sentencing options. For instance, if the
judge had chosen the aggravated sentence for each charge, the
ultimate sentence would have been eight years and eight months. In
that situation, residential burglary would have been the principal
charge; the drug and grand theft charges would have been
31subordinate terms. With different initial sentencing choices, a
range of sentencing outcomes could be generated, including three
years and four months; four years and five months; and six years and
eight months. 32 In a three strikes case, the range of options would be
even more extreme. 
33
This example highlights a core problem in California's
sentencing system. The system limits the kinds of sentencing
options a judge can endorse to some degree, but it does so in a
largely irrational manner. Rather than constraining judicial
discretion in a coherent way (to a limited range, such as three to five
years), it gives the court a number of sentencing options, which can
span a wide range. The danger of such a range of choices is
sentencing disparity, inconsistency, and incoherence of sentencing
results. As a guided discretion approach, California's sentencing
system fails as well.
31. The contributions would be: six years for residential burglary, eight months for the drug
offense, one year for the grand theft offense, and one year for the prior record.
32. If the court chooses the middle terms, the sentence would be six years, eight months
(four years for the residential burglary, eight months for the drug offense, one year for grand
theft, and one year for the prior record). If the judge chooses the mitigated terms, the sentence
would be four years, five and one-third months (two years, four months for the grand theft; five
and one-third months for the drugs; eight months for the residential burglary; and one year for the
prior criminal record). Finally, if the judge chooses the mitigated terms for all charges and runs
the sentences concurrently, the sentence would be three years, four months (two years, four
months for grand theft, and one year for the prior criminal record).
33. In testimony before the Little Hoover Commission, Judge Richard Couzens gave the
hypothetical of a defendant with two prior serious felony convictions who is accused of stealing a
chainsaw valued at $350 from a store. The judge in that case would have to decide initially
whether to treat the larceny as a misdemeanor or a felony. In the former case, the defendant
would receive probation and local jail time. In the latter, the judge would then have to determine
whether to sentence the defendant under the three strikes law, or whether to eliminate one or both
of the prior strikes. When all is said and done, the sentencing options theoretically available
would include: (1) probation with local jail time; (2) a prison term of sixteen months to three
years; (3) a prison term of nearly three years up to six years; or (4) a life sentence of twenty-five
years to life. See LITTLE HOOVER COMM'N, supra note 19, at 36.
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C. Well-Designed Rule-Making Body
The final requirement of a fair sentencing system is the
establishment of a rule-making body that is well-suited for balancing
the myriad factors that go into a wise punishment decision. To put
the point another way, even a system that is easy to use and narrows
judicial discretion will fail if the discretion-limiting rules are poorly
designed.
California again offers a ready example of this problem. Its
Three Strikes provision narrows judicial discretion to a dramatic
degree. Defendants subject to the Three Strikes law must be
sentenced to twenty-five years to life in prison, regardless of the
sentence the court feels is appropriate. But as many commentators
have discussed, the provision often results in deeply unjust
sentences, imposing long sentences on offenders who warrant far
less punishment. Discretion-constraining rules are not, in other
words, good in themselves.
How does one ensure that the sentencing rules are appropriately
constructed? This is ultimately a question of institutional design.
The challenge is to establish a rule-making body that, because of its
structure and values, has the institutional competence and orientation
to establish appropriately designed rules. In California's case, the
sentencing rules have been constructed largely through a political
process - either through legislative design (the DSL) or through the
initiative process (the Three Strikes provision and others). Is the
political process the appropriate way to fashion discretion-limiting
rules? The answer depends on what one views is the goal of the
sentencing system. Different considerations will be relevant
depending on what purpose the sentencing system is supposed to
serve; different institutions might be better suited for assessing
certain factors rather than others.
The purpose of punishment, of course, is a controversial topic.
For the past quarter century, "just deserts" has been the dominant
purpose, and it has been used to justify the movement towards
harsher sentences and mandatory minimum statutes. A strong
argument can be made, however, that the utilitarian goal of public
safety is a far more appealing goal. As Judge Michael Wolff has
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stated, "[p]rison, it hardly needs to be said, should be reserved for
those whom we really are afraid of, not those we are mad at."' 34
What sorts of factors are relevant in developing sentencing rules
that serve utilitarian goals? The answer is complex. In terms of
social welfare, any sentencing decision will generate both costs and
benefits. The principal benefit of punishment is straightforward -
public safety - achieved largely through incapacitation, deterrence,
and rehabilitation. By contrast, the costs of punishment are varied;
they include the financial costs to society in housing offenders, third
party costs, and the costs to the defendant himself.
What sort of institution is well-suited to evaluating and balancing
this broad range of factors? Although generalizations are extremely
difficult, one thing is clear: the political process (i.e. the legislature
or initiative process) is ill-suited for evaluating the "costs" of
punishment.
The political appeal of increasing sentence lengths is obvious.
Being tough on crime always seems like a safe political posture.
Prisoners and their advocates are a weak voting block, which means
that the electoral costs are slim. The ultimate fiscal and human costs
of increasing sentences also lie in the distant future, outside the time
horizon of the typical legislator. From the politician's point of view,
increased sentencing is almost all benefit and no cost.
In this regard, it is not surprising that California's sentencing
system has tended toward longer sentences, with little regard to
social or human cost. A burgeoning prison population is the
predictable result. This means that any effort to reform California's
sentencing structure needs to identify a method of reducing the
powerful and direct influence of the political branches in the
development of sentencing rules.
III. Reforming California's Sentencing System
Given the deep defects in the State's sentencing system, the
natural question is: how should California's system be reformed?
Recent proposals have sought to make rather modest changes to
specific sentencing rules, such as increasing good time credits for
34. Michael Wolff, Lock 'Em Up and Throw Away the Key? Cutting Recidivism by
Analyzing Sentencing Outcomes, 20 FED. SENT'G REP. 321 (2008).
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inmates who complete certain rehabilitation programs, reclassifying
some felonies as misdemeanors, and allowing elderly inmates to
finish part of their sentences at home or in hospitals.
These are all worthy reforms, but they are changes at the
margins. As the previous analysis indicates, California's sentencing
system is flawed at its very core. It is exceptionally complex, fails to
cabin judicial discretion in an appropriate way, and relies on a
flawed system of rulemaking. In this situation, modest changes to
individual rules will not suffice; a complete overhaul of California's
sentencing system is necessary.
What should take the place of California's problematic
institution of punishment? Consider the three criteria discussed
above.
First, administrative feasibility. One can imagine many possible
approaches for reforming the State's sentencing system to make it
easier to administer. For example, a return to indeterminate
sentencing (where judges have free reign to choose a sentence within
broad ranges) would be much easier to implement. Indeed, it would
result in the elimination of virtually all the current sentencing rules,
leaving the ultimate decision over sentencing to judges. Such an
approach, however, would violate the second principle discussed
above - the principle that an effective sentencing system must
impose some constraints on the exercise of judicial discretion.
Hence, indeterminate sentencing is a non-starter.
A more appealing approach would be a sentencing guideline
system designed to cabin judicial discretion. Guideline systems are
favored by a significant number of states, as well as the federal
government. These systems vary dramatically in their complexity:
from extremely complex and detailed systems (e.g., the federal
system) to much more streamlined approaches (e.g., North
Carolina's system).35 But even the most complex guideline system
is more rational and coherent than California's morass. 36
35. See, e.g., Gerald Lynch, Marvin Frankel: A Reformer Reassessed, 21 FED. SENT'G REP.
235, 238 (2009) ("Some state guidelines, such as those in North Carolina, have been widely
hailed for bringing order and logic to state sentencing, and even for sharply reducing prison
populations. Others, such as the Federal Guidelines, have been criticized as unnecessarily rigid,
unduly complex, and extremely harsh.").
36. The Constitution Project Sentencing Initiative provides a series of recommendations for
simplifying the federal guideline system. See Constitution Project Sentencing Initiative,
Recommendations for Federal Criminal Sentencing in a Post-Booker World, 18 FED. SENT'G
REP. 310 (2006). For a summary of the project's goals and recommendations, see Frank 0.
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The goal of a guideline system would be to rationalize the State's
sentencing rules, "bring[ing] the thousands of existing sentencing
enhancement into some sort of cohesive structure., 37 Ideally, this
approach would cabin judicial discretion without being excessively
rigid.
A critical question concerns the institution that should develop
these guideline rules. We have already criticized the State's reliance
on the political branches for designing sentencing rules. But what
alternatives remain? One option is to allow the judiciary to develop
sentencing guidelines through a kind of "common law" approach.
Under that approach, trial courts would announce sentences,
explaining their rationale in each case. Over time appellate courts
and the California Supreme Court might refine rules into ranges for
certain prototypical crimes and criminals. Great Britain has tried this
approach.38
A "common law" approach to sentencing, however, has serious
shortcomings. As we noted, any rulemaking institution should have
the competence to balance competing factors: the public safety
benefits of punishment on one hand, and the fiscal, human, and third
party costs on the other. The judiciary, operating through the
common law process, does not seem particularly well-suited to this
analysis.
For instance, to properly assess the public safety benefits of
punishment, one would need to collect and analyze the latest
research on recidivism, deterrence, and rehabilitation. Individual
judges (or appellate courts) do not seem particularly competent in
that endeavor. Similarly, the institution must be able to assess the
costs of punishment, both to the state budget and to third parties.
Again, the judiciary seems ill-equipped for making this assessment.
A sentencing "commission" would seem to be a far better
alternative. 39  A properly constituted commission would be better
Bowman, III, 'Tis a Gift to Be Simple: A Model Reform of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 18
FED. SENT'G REP. 301 (2006).
37. Kara Dansky, Understanding California Sentencing, 43 U.S.F. L. REV. 45, 73 (2008)
(discussing guideline proposals).
38. See, e.g., D.A. Thomas, The Role of the Court of Appeal in the English Sentencing
System, 10 FED. SENT'G REP. 259 (1998).
39. Such an approach has been the favored option of the ALI, in its recent Model Penal
Code sentencing project. See AM. LAW INST., MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING, TENTATIVE
DRAFT NO.1 Sec. 6A.01 (Apr. 8, 2009) (recommending establishment of a sentencing
commission).
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able to assess both the public safety effects and the human costs of
punishment. The key qualifier here is "properly constituted."
Whether a sentencing commission succeeds in this task depends on a
host of additional factors, including the institution's structure and
staffing.
For example, if the sentencing commission is staffed by
political appointees who have short terms and can be removed at will
by the Governor, the commission will truly become a "junior
varsity" legislature, sharing many of the flaws of the political
branches of government in the sentencing sphere. 40  Any truly
effective sentencing commission must, in short, possess a significant
degree of insulation from political pressures.
Various institutional mechanisms might be used to insulate the
commission. As an example, a bipartisan state commission might be
established to appoint commission members (just as many states
have commissions to make recommendations for judgeships).
Similarly, members might be appointed to serve long, staggered
terms. And commission members might be equally divided between
the political parties. The goal would be to create a relatively
bipartisan, politically insulated institution dedicated to sentencing.
To ensure the commission would have access to the latest studies
and reports, the institution should be staffed by experts in law,
criminology, and related disciplines. This would enable the
commission to stay up-to-date on current research regarding
deterrence, recidivism risk for different offenders, and feasibility of
rehabilitation. The goal would be to promote decisions based on
empirical evidence, rather than the political whims of the public or
the legislature. Moreover, since the institution would be an on-going
entity, it would be able to make changes as circumstances change
and as new information about the effects of sentencing practices
comes to light.
Finally, certain additional institutional constraints might be
useful in ensuring that the institution considers the relevant costs and
benefits of punishment. For instance, the temptation will always
exist to increase sentences, ignoring the long term costs of such
initiatives. To counteract that tendency, it might make sense to adopt
a kind of "pay-as-you-go" rule, which would allow increased
40. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 427 (1989).
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sentences only if funds for the costs of punishment are allocated (or
off-setting cuts are made) at the same time.4 1
Lastly, to help guide the commission in its deliberations, the
legislature (or the commission itself) should identify an overriding
purpose of its sentencing decisions and attempt to orient its practices to
serve that purpose. Ideally, the legislature would adopt the promotion
of social welfare as the overriding goal, rather than the retributive goals
of "punishment" or "just deserts."4 An institution that sets clear goals
can act more consistently and effectively in meeting those objectives
and in communicating its underlying rationale.
So we can see the outlines of a sentencing system. The Determinate
Sentencing Law and the Three Strikes law would be repealed and
replaced by a more coherent and workable guided discretion system. A
politically insulated commission would enact rules that would limit
judicial discretion to some degree. And judges would retain a fair
degree of discretion to take account of unusual circumstances. These
changes taken together would, I am confident, make California's
system fairer and more effective. It is a change long past due.
IV. Looking Ahead
What are the chances that a guideline approach of this sort might
be implemented? Between 1984 and 2007, at least eight attempts
were made to create a state sentencing commission.43 Influential
think tanks, like the Little Hoover Commission, have given such
efforts their full support. Nonetheless, none of the proposals have
passed the legislature.
This past summer gave renewed hope to sentencing reformers.
In June, a sentencing commission proposal passed the Assembly by a
41. Virginia adopted a similar sort of approach. See Daniel Wilhelm & Nicolas Turner, Is
the Budget Crisis Changing the Way We Look at Sentencing and Incarceration? 10-11 (2002)
available at http://www.nacdl.org/sl-docs.nsf/issues/sentencingreform/$FILE/vera-jun02.pdf
(discussing how Virginia requires a "fiscal impact statement" for any bill resulting in an increase
in sentences. A finance subcommittee "then determines if there is funding to support the bill. If
not, the bill dies without reaching the floor for final consideration .... In short, if the sponsor
cannot find the money to pay for the increased correctional burden, the bill cannot get to the floor
for a vote.").
42. See generally Michael Marcus, Comments on the Model Penal Code: Sentencing
Preliminary Draft No. 1, 30 AM. J. CRIM. L. 135 (2003) (arguing for the adoption of "crime
reduction" as the primary purpose of sentencing systems).
43. See LITrLE HOOVER COMM'N, supra note 19, at 63-65; Dansky, supra note 37, at 73.
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vote of fifty to twenty-nine. However, the bill was short on details;
it appeared to be a place-holder for a more detailed bill expected to
emerge later. 4  Subsequently, a more elaborate sentencing
commission proposal was introduced into the Senate as part of a
broader package of sentencing reforms.45 On August 20, 2009, that
bill, including the sentencing commission proposal, passed the
Senate by the slimmest of margins: twenty-one to nineteen.
The Senate-passed bill was then debated in the Assembly.
Unfortunately, in the end, the Assembly gutted large parts of the
reform package and eliminated the sentencing commission proposal.
On October 11, 2009, the legislature approved a slimmed-down
sentencing reform package that did not include the proposal to
establish a sentencing commission.
46
Many viewed the defeat of the sentencing commission proposal
to be a great loss for sentencing reform in California. At the same
time, it is worth noting that the Senate-passed proposal was not a
perfect bill. As noted earlier, political independence is one key
requirement of an effective sentencing commission. However, the
Senate-passed proposal endorsed a commission structure with strong
links to the political process.
For instance, under the proposal, the Governor would have the
authority to appoint eight of the thirteen commission members.47
This feature alone raises questions about whether the sentencing
commission would ultimately operate in a politically neutral and
insulated manner. Similarly, the proposal did not require that the
members be divided between the two parties, or that there be a "pay-
as-you-go" feature of the proposal. Finally, the proposal appears to
44. The bill, in full, said: "There is hereby established an independent, multijurisdictional
body to provide a nonpartisan forum for statewide policy development, information development,
research, and planning concerning criminal sentences and their effects." Assem. 1376, 2009-10
Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2009).
45. The sentencing commission proposal was based on a proposal introduced by Assembly
Member Arambula. Assem. 14, 2009-10 Leg., 3d Extra Sess. (Cal. 2009).
46. See S. 18, 2009-10 Leg., 3d Extr. Sess. (Cal. 2009).
47. This was one of the features of the bill that the Governor mentioned when endorsing the
proposal. Governor Schwarzenegger's spokesman said the Governor supported this version
"because it would allow him to appoint the members, would have a majority of public safety
members, and 'has teeth."' Jack Chang, Sentencing Panel Sets off Alarms, SACRAMENTO BEE,
Aug. 20, 2009, at IA. The spokesman added: "It's important that the commission would have
real authority .... We've been debating this for two years. It's time to act." Id.
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adopt "just deserts" as the dominant purpose of punishment. 4 8
Public safety goals of rehabilitation, deterrence, and incapacitation
are to be pursued only "when reasonably feasible.",
49
Even with these flaws, the proposal would be a step forward for
California. The state sentencing system is in such a sorry state that
even a less than ideal guideline system would be an improvement.
But with the slate now clean, the bar should be set higher. If the
state legislature ever finds the courage to reform the current system,
it should seize the moment to adopt a truly effective and carefully-
calibrated guideline system with a commission insulated from
political pressure. Whether the legislature or the Governor would
ever seriously consider such a proposal is another matter entirely.
But dreamers can dream, can't they?
48. "The general purposes of rules ... are the following: . . .In decisions affecting the
sentencing or paroling of individual offenders, . . . [t]o render sentencing in all cases within a
range of severity proportionate to the gravity of the offense, the harms done to the crime victims,
and the blameworthiness of the offenders." Assem. 14, 2009-10 Leg., 3d Extr. Sess. (Cal. 2009).
49. Id. This language does not appear in the enacted Senate bill. See S. 18, 2009-10 Leg.,
3d Extr. Sess. (Cal. 2009).
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